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 Goodyear Dunlap 
Tires v. Brown and  
J. McIntyre v. Nicastro 
 Megan M. La Belle 
 S
ince the World Wide Web was introduced in the 
early 1990s, it has infiltrated so many aspects of our 
personal and professional lives. We use the Internet 
to communicate, conduct business, shop, socialize, 
entertain ourselves, and gather information. In many 
ways, the Internet has made our lives easier and better. 
Yet by facilitating and increasing contact with the rest of 
the world, the Internet potentially expands the doctrine 
of personal jurisdiction and exposes individuals and cor-
porations to suit in distant and inconvenient locations. 
 For the past two decades, courts have struggled 
with the question of how Internet-related contacts 
should be treated in the personal jurisdiction analy-
sis. Some courts have utilized the traditional mini-
mum contacts framework of  International Shoe v. 
Washington , 1 while others have devised new tests 
to accommodate this technological evolution. 2 So 
when the US Supreme Court granted certiorari in 
two personal jurisdiction cases last term— Goodyear 
Dunlap Tires v. Brown 3 and  J. McIntyre v. Nicastro 4 —
many believed these unsettled questions of Internet-
related personal jurisdiction would finally be resolved. 
Disappointingly for litigants, lower courts, and aca-
demics, however,  Goodyear and  McIntyre give little 
guidance about the future of personal jurisdiction in 
our virtual world. 
 PERSONAL JURISDICTION BEFORE 
 GOODYEAR AND  MCINTYRE 
 Before last term, it had been nearly a quarter of a 
century since the Supreme Court considered the doc-
trine of personal jurisdiction. To better understand 
the issues decided by the Court, our starting point 
is the state of personal jurisdiction jurisprudence 
before  Goodyear and  McIntyre . The test for personal 
jurisdiction involves a two-step inquiry: (1) Does 
the forum state’s long-arm statute authorize personal 
jurisdiction? and (2) Would the exercise of jurisdic-
tion comport with due process? 5 Since most state 
long-arm statutes are co-extensive with the limits of 
due process, the two inquiries frequently collapse into 
one, and so the question is whether the assertion of 
personal jurisdiction would violate the Due Process 
Clause. 6 
 The touchstone of due process for personal 
jurisdiction over absent defendants is whether they 
have meaningful “contacts, ties, or relations” with 
the forum state and thus could reasonably anticipate 
being haled into court there. 7 In other words, a court 
cannot force a party to defend a lawsuit in a state 
unless the defendant has the requisite “minimum con-
tacts” with that state, and the exercise of jurisdiction 
would not offend “traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice.” 8 
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 Two profiles of personal jurisdiction have evolved 
since  International Shoe : general jurisdiction and spe-
cific jurisdiction. In order to be subject to a court’s 
general jurisdiction, the defendant must have “con-
tinuous and systematic” contacts with the forum 
state. 9 Assuming such contacts exist, courts may 
exercise jurisdiction over the defendant with respect 
to any type of lawsuit, even if the action is not related 
to the defendant’s contacts with the forum state. 
 Specific jurisdiction, on the other hand, requires 
less pervasive contacts between the defendant and the 
forum state. Under this doctrine, however, courts are 
only permitted to exercise jurisdiction over a defen-
dant if the lawsuit arises out of—or is related to—
the defendant’s contacts with the forum. Moreover, 
the defendant’s contacts with the forum state must 
be purposeful, and the assertion of jurisdiction must 
be reasonable and fair. 10 In this situation, the “‘rela-
tionship among the defendant, the forum, and the 
litigation,’ is the essential foundation of  in personam 
jurisdiction.” 11 
 These jurisdictional constructs provide standards 
for courts and litigants regarding the personal juris-
diction analysis. Yet, because the question of whether 
a non-resident defendant is subject to personal juris-
diction in a forum state is heavily fact-dependent, the 
outcome of jurisdictional disputes is always difficult to 
predict; and when the defendant’s only contacts with 
the forum state are indirect, the personal jurisdiction 
analysis becomes even more complicated. 
 THE STREAM OF COMMERCE AND 
PERSONAL JURISDICTION 
 In the decades following  International Shoe , 
the economy continued to grow and the flow of 
commerce between the states steadily increased. 
Consequently, corporations transacted significant 
business that crossed stated lines—they maintained 
stores and manufacturing facilities, sold goods and 
services, advertised, and employed people in other 
states. With this fundamental transformation of 
the national economy came more expansive theo-
ries of personal jurisdiction, namely, the  stream-of-
commerce doctrine. 12 
 The stream-of-commerce doctrine is not a dis-
tinctive theory of personal jurisdiction, but provides 
a methodology for satisfying the purposeful availment 
requirement of specific jurisdiction. Plaintiffs rely on 
this jurisdictional doctrine when the defendant’s only 
contacts with the forum state are that its products 
were placed into the stream of commerce and were 
ultimately sold in the state. The question, therefore, 
is whether a defendant purposefully avails itself 
of a forum state by “deliver[ing] its products into 
the stream of commerce with the expectation that 
they will be purchased by consumers in the forum 
state.” 13 
 The Supreme Court last addressed the stream-of- 
commerce issue almost twenty-five years ago in  Asahi 
Metal Industry v. Superior Court . 14 Unfortunately, 
the parameters of the stream-of-commerce doctrine 
were not well defined in  Asahi ; thus, there has been 
great confusion in this area for a long time now. In 
 Asahi , a majority of the justices could not agree as 
to the requirements for personal jurisdiction under a 
stream-of-commerce theory. One opinion, authored 
by Justice O’Connor, found that “[t]he placement of a 
product into the stream-of-commerce, without more, 
is not an act of the defendant purposefully directed 
toward the forum State,” and that the requisite 
something “more” might be marketing, advertising, 
service, or design done with the forum in mind. 15 
Justice Brennan opined, by contrast, that placing a 
product in the stream of commerce with an aware-
ness “that the final product is being marketed in the 
forum State” is all that is necessary for purposeful 
availment. 16 
 In the wake of  Asahi , many appellate courts 
adopted either Justice O’Connor’s or Justice Brennan’s 
approach to stream-of-commerce jurisdiction. 17 Other 
courts disregarded  Asahi since there was not a major-
ity opinion and instead have followed earlier personal 
jurisdiction cases like  World Wide Volkswagen Corp. 
v. Woodson . 18 The result is an extremely complicated 
jurisprudential landscape, which the Internet has 
made even more difficult to navigate. 
 INTERNET-RELATED CONTACTS 
AND PERSONAL JURISDICTION 
 The Internet has had a profound impact on the 
way we communicate, conduct business, and engage 
in commercial transactions. The volume of transstate 
and transnational contacts has increased dramati-
cally and so questions of personal jurisdiction have 
moved to the forefront in the Internet age. While 
some courts have continued to apply the traditional 
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minimum contacts test to Internet-based jurisdiction, 
others have taken a different tack.  Zippo Manufacturing 
v. Zippo DOT Com , 19 for example, established a sliding 
scale of Internet activity test that has gained popular-
ity with many other courts. 
 The  Zippo case arose in the context of a trade-
mark dispute, but it has had far-reaching implications. 
The question in  Zippo was whether the defendant—a 
California corporation whose principal business was 
an Internet news service that allowed online users to 
access newsgroups through its Web site—was subject 
to specific personal jurisdiction in Pennsylvania. 
The primary issue was whether the defendant had 
purposefully availed itself of Pennsylvania by engag-
ing in electronic commerce with residents of that 
forum. To answer this question, the court introduced 
a sliding-scale test that characterizes virtual contacts 
as falling into three categories. 20 At one end of the 
scale are “active” Web sites used to conduct business 
transactions. At the opposite end of the spectrum 
are “passive” Web sites where a defendant simply 
makes information available on a Web site that may 
be accessed by residents of other states. And in the 
middle of the sliding scale are “interactive” Web sites, 
which allow for the exchange of information between 
the Web site’s host and non-residents, but where busi-
ness transactions do not necessarily occur. Under this 
sliding scale test, the maintenance of an active Web 
site amounts to purposeful availment, while the main-
tenance of a passive Web site does not. Interactive 
Web sites may or may not subject the defendant to 
personal jurisdiction depending on the specific nature 
of the site. 21 
 In theory, the use of a bright-line test like the 
one announced in  Zippo is beneficial. It should 
increase predictability for litigants and ease the bur-
den on the courts in deciding difficult jurisdictional 
questions. But this “one-size-fits-all” approach con-
tradicts the Supreme Court’s mandate that personal 
jurisdiction be decided on a case-by-case basis. 22 
Moreover, many courts have reflexively followed 
the  Zippo test without regard to either the basic 
tenets of the personal jurisdiction doctrine or the 
particular factual circumstances of the case. For 
example, some courts have subjected defendants to 
general jurisdiction under the  Zippo sliding-scale 
test even though  Zippo applies only to the specific 
jurisdiction analysis. 23 Other courts applying  Zippo 
have diverged over the definition of interactivity 
or have tweaked  Zippo to require a target audience 
in the forum or a history of actual interaction with 
forum residents. 24 
 Thus, the supposedly simple-to-apply  Zippo test 
has, in actuality, contributed to the creation of a 
body-of-case law on Internet-related personal juris-
diction that is confusing, inconsistent, and sometimes 
even inaccurate. When the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari in  Goodyear and  McIntyre last term, many 
hoped these unsettled questions regarding personal 
jurisdiction would finally be resolved. 
 THE GOODYEAR AND 
MCINTYRE CASES 
 The  Goodyear and  McIntyre cases share many 
commonalities: they involved product liability claims; 
the defendants were foreign entities; and the Supreme 
Court ultimately determined that personal jurisdic-
tion was lacking in both cases. Yet there are also 
distinctions between  Goodyear and  McIntyre . Most 
significantly,  Goodyear was a general jurisdiction case, 
while the plaintiff in  McIntyre was relying on a theory 
of specific jurisdiction. 
 Goodyear Dunlap Tires v. Brown 
 The dispute in  Goodyear revolved around a bus 
accident in Paris, France, that killed two thirteen-
year-old boys from North Carolina who were travel-
ing with their soccer team. 25 Alleging that faulty tires 
caused the accident, the boys’ families sued Goodyear 
USA and its Turkish subsidiary (“Goodyear Turkey”), 
the manufacturer of the tires involved in the accident, 
in state court in North Carolina. The state court held 
that Goodyear Turkey was subject to general jurisdic-
tion in North Carolina because it had continuously 
and systematically placed products into the stream of 
commerce destined for North Carolina. Specifically, 
the court cited Goodyear Turkey’s significant volume 
of tire sales in the state between 2004 and 2007 as the 
basis for subjecting the defendant to general jurisdic-
tion in North Carolina. 26 
 The US Supreme Court granted certiorari to 
answer the following question: “Are foreign subsidiar-
ies of a United States parent corporation amenable to 
suit in state court on claims unrelated to any activ-
ity of the subsidiaries in the forum state?” 27 Before 
answering that question, however, the Court made 
clear that there was no basis for exercising specific 
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jurisdiction in this case because the defendant’s 
contacts with North Carolina—the sale of tires in 
that state—did not relate to the plaintiff ’s claim. 
The Court explained that the accident did not occur 
in North Carolina, the tires were not manufactured 
there, and none of the tires involved in the accident 
had been sold in North Carolina. Thus, there was no 
nexus between the plaintiff ’s claim and the defen-
dant’s contacts with the forum as required by specific 
jurisdiction principles. 28 
 Turning then to general jurisdiction, the Court 
first indicated that the North Carolina courts’ reli-
ance on stream of commerce was misplaced since this 
was a general jurisdiction case and that the theory 
applies only in the specific jurisdiction context. 29 
With that clarification, the Court held that general 
jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant is appro-
priate when the defendant’s contacts with the state 
are so continuous and systematic as to render the 
defendant essentially “at home” in the forum State. 30 
While declining to explicate this “at home” standard, 
the Court applied it to the case at bar, determined 
that Goodyear Turkey was not subject to personal 
jurisdiction in North Carolina, and reversed the deci-
sion of the lower court. 31 
 J. McIntyre v. Nicastro  
 Unlike  Goodyear , the  McIntyre case raised 
questions about the specific jurisdiction doc-
trine. 32 In  McIntyre , the plaintiff Robert Nicastro 
seriously injured his hand while using a metal-
shearing machine manufactured by the defendant 
J. McIntyre Machinery (“J. McIntyre”). Although 
the accident occurred in New Jersey, the machine 
was manufactured in England where J. McIntyre 
is incorporated and operates. Nicastro’s employer, 
Curcio Scrap Metal (“Curcio”), did not purchase 
the machine directly from J. McIntyre. Instead, 
J. McIntyre sold its machines to a US distributor in 
Ohio who then sold one of the machines to Curcio 
in New Jersey. 33 
 Nicastro sued J. McIntyre in New Jersey state 
court alleging that the machine was defective, and J. 
McIntyre challenged personal jurisdiction. The case 
made its way to the New Jersey Supreme Court, which 
adopted Justice Brennan’s position from  Asahi and 
held that J. McIntyre had subjected itself to personal 
jurisdiction in New Jersey. Invoking the stream-of-
commerce theory, the court held that a defendant like 
J. McIntyre purposefully avails itself of a foreign state 
so long as it “knew or reasonably should have known 
that its products are distributed through a nationwide 
distribution system that might lead to those products 
being sold in any of the fifty states.” 34 
 The US Supreme Court granted certiorari and 
reversed. Although six justices agreed that J. McIntyre 
was not subject to personal jurisdiction in New 
Jersey, the Court failed to muster a majority on any 
particular rationale. Writing for the plurality, Justice 
Kennedy first stated that, in products liability cases 
like this one, personal jurisdiction depends on the 
defendant’s purposeful availment. 35 The plurality then 
acknowledged that a defendant may purposefully avail 
itself by sending goods, rather than agents, into a 
forum state. 36 However, the plurality explained, “[t]he 
defendant’s transmission of goods permits the exercise 
of jurisdiction only where the defendant can be said 
to have targeted the forum; as a general rule, it is not 
enough that the defendant might have predicted that 
its goods will reach the forum State.” 37 In other words, 
the plurality in  McIntyre appears to have adopted 
Justice O’Connor’s  stream-of-commerce “plus” test for 
purposeful availment. 
 The plurality did not stop there, however. A 
significant portion of the opinion is spent attempt-
ing to explain why the Constitution limits states like 
New Jersey from exercising personal jurisdiction over 
defendants like J. McIntyre. While conceding that 
the personal jurisdiction doctrine is grounded in the 
Due Process Clause, the plurality argued that notions 
of state sovereignty also limit the exercise of personal 
jurisdiction over non-residents. 38 
 Despite this in-depth discussion of state sover-
eignty, the plurality ultimately decided the case based 
on its evaluation of the purposeful availment prong 
of the specific jurisdiction test. In the plurality’s view, 
J. McIntyre did not purposefully avail itself of New 
Jersey because the defendant only intended to serve 
the US market as a whole, not New Jersey in particu-
lar; the defendant’s officers attended trade shows in 
several states, but not New Jersey; and only four of 
the machines involved in the accident ended up in 
New Jersey. 39 Under these circumstances, the plural-
ity held that the exercise of jurisdiction would offend 
due process. 40 
 In addition to the plurality, there were also 
concurring and dissenting opinions in  McIntyre . 
Like the plurality, the concurrence of Justices Breyer 
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and Alito held that J. McIntyre was not subject to 
personal jurisdiction in New Jersey; for a number of 
reasons, however, the concurrence declined to join 
the plurality’s opinion. First and foremost, the con-
currence did not believe this was an appropriate case 
in which to fashion new jurisdictional rules based on 
our evolving global economy. 41 While acknowledging 
that commerce and communication has undergone 
significant transformation in recent years, the con-
currence emphasized that the machine at issue in 
 McIntyre ended up in New Jersey through traditional 
commercial channels. Nicastro did not claim that 
J. McIntyre was subject to jurisdiction in New Jersey 
based on its “virtual” contacts with the state. Unlike 
in many modern cases, there were no allegations that 
the defendant maintained a Web site or engaged in 
e-commerce. Accordingly, Justice Breyer believed it 
unwise to rework the personal jurisdiction doctrine 
“without a better understanding of the relevant con-
temporary commercial circumstances.” 42 
 With this concern in mind, the concurrence held 
that the jurisdictional question in  McIntyre could be 
resolved by looking to the facts and adhering strictly 
to prior precedent, thereby avoiding any broad pro-
nouncements regarding personal jurisdiction juris-
prudence. Unlike the plurality, Justices Breyer and 
Alito did not choose sides in the stream-of-commerce 
debate because they believed that defendant had not 
purposefully availed itself of New Jersey under either 
test. 43 Focusing exclusively on the facts presented to 
the lower court and refusing to consider anything 
outside the record, the concurrence concluded that 
J. McIntyre was not subject to personal jurisdiction 
in New Jersey. 44 
 In contradistinction to the plurality and concur-
rence, the dissent—which was authored by Justice 
Ginsburg and joined by Justices Sotomayor and 
Kagan—held that New Jersey’s exercise of personal 
jurisdiction over J. McIntyre was constitutional. 45 
In reaching this decision, the dissent highlighted 
J. McIntyre’s connection with New Jersey, especially 
the fact that the machine was in New Jersey and that 
is where Nicastro was injured. The dissent distin-
guished  Asahi on the grounds that the defendant in 
that case was only a component-part manufacturer 
and did not itself seek out customers in the United 
States, unlike J. McIntyre. 46 The dissent also rejected 
the plurality’s rationale, concluding “the constitu-
tional limits on a state court’s adjudicatory authority 
derive from considerations of due process, not state 
sovereignty.” 47 Finally, after noting that fairness is 
the touchstone of personal jurisdiction, the dissent 
held that there is nothing unfair about subjecting a 
corporate defendant like J. McIntyre to jurisdiction 
in New Jersey—the forum where its product was sold 
and caused the plaintiff ’s injury. 
 THE FUTURE OF INTERNET-
RELATED PERSONAL 
JURISDICTION 
 When the US Supreme Court granted certiorari 
in  Goodyear and  McIntyre , many believed that the 
decisions would provide greater guidance on the doc-
trines of general and specific jurisdiction, particularly 
in the Internet context. Unfortunately,  Goodyear and 
 McIntyre failed to resolve certain outstanding ques-
tions related to personal jurisdiction, such as the split 
in  Asahi between Justices O’Connor and Brennan. 
Moreover,  Goodyear and  McIntyre raise a whole 
host of new issues about the future of the personal 
jurisdiction doctrine. Yet, until the Court speaks on 
these issues again, litigants and lower courts are left 
to extrapolate the lessons to be learned from these 
two cases. 
 Of the two cases,  Goodyear ’s impact on Internet-
related personal jurisdiction is easier to predict. 
Before  Goodyear , some courts held that a defendant’s 
virtual contacts with a forum state were sufficient 
under the  Zippo sliding scale test to support general 
jurisdiction.  Gator.com Corp. v. L.L. Bean, Inc., is a 
good example. 48 In that case, the Ninth Circuit held 
that the defendant L.L. Bean was subject to general 
jurisdiction in California because it conducted busi-
ness over the Internet, and its Internet business con-
tacts with California were substantial, continuous, 
and systematic. The court reasoned that “an online 
store can operate as the functional equivalent of a 
physical store,” and the nature of L.L. Bean’s com-
mercial activity in California was substantial enough 
that it “approximated physical presence” sufficient for 
general jurisdiction. 49 
 Similarly, in  Gorman v. Ameritrade Holding 
Corp. , 50 the US Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia Circuit held a non-resident defendant 
subject to general jurisdiction based on its virtual 
contacts with the District. In the court’s opinion, 
defendant Ameritrade Holding Corp., an online 
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brokerage firm, had  subjected itself to jurisdiction by 
maintaining a Web site through which it conducted 
business in the District. Specifically, customers in 
the District could use the Web site to open accounts, 
transmit funds to those accounts electronically, use 
the accounts to buy and sell securities, and enter 
into binding contracts with the defendant. In turn, 
defendant would transmit electronic confirmations, 
account statements, and other financial informa-
tion back to its customers in the District. 51 If these 
contacts between Ameritrade and its customers were 
substantial, continuous, and systematic, general juris-
diction would lie in the District. 52 
 The decision in  Goodyear casts doubt on the 
holding and rationale of  L.L. Bean ,  Ameritrade , and 
similar cases basing general jurisdiction on continu-
ous and systematic virtual contacts with the forum 
state. 53 The  Goodyear Court attempted to provide 
additional guidance for gauging general jurisdiction 
and explained that the defendant not only must have 
continuous and systematic contacts with the forum 
state, but must be “at home” there too. 54 Although 
the Court did not define this “at home” standard, 
it held unanimously that Goodyear Turkey’s con-
tinuous and systematic sale of its products into North 
Carolina fell short. Thus, the looming question after 
 Goodyear is whether any sort of “doing business” 
jurisdiction survives, or whether corporate defendants 
will only be subject to general jurisdiction where they 
are actually at home, meaning where they are incor-
porated and headquartered. Either way, it is plain 
that  Goodyear narrowed the breadth of the general 
jurisdiction doctrine. 
 It is harder to foresee how  McIntyre might affect 
personal jurisdiction jurisprudence. As is already 
becoming evident, courts will respond differently to 
this decision. Some courts will continue to rely on 
earlier cases in resolving personal jurisdiction disputes 
since there was no majority opinion in  McIntyre . 55 
Others will follow  Marks v. United States, which held 
that “[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a case and 
no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the 
assent of five Justices, the holding of the Court may 
be viewed as the position taken by those Members 
who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest 
grounds….” 56 Applying this test, one court recently 
decided that  McIntyre stands for the proposition that 
“specific jurisdiction must arise from a defendant’s 
deliberate connection with the forum state,” rather 
than with the United States as a whole. 57 Finally, 
there will be courts that mistakenly treat the plurality 
decision in  McIntyre as a majority opinion, the result 
of which will be a much stricter interpretation of the 
specific jurisdiction doctrine. 58 
 While it is difficult to predict how lower courts 
will interpret and apply  McIntyre , there is a good 
chance that the Supreme Court will provide addi-
tional guidance on personal jurisdiction sometime 
soon. Three of the nine members of the Court—
Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan—dissented 
and likely would welcome the opportunity to recon-
sider the jurisdictional issues left unresolved by 
 McIntyre . Perhaps more significantly, the concurrence 
stated explicitly that  McIntyre was not the proper 
case for retooling the personal jurisdiction doctrine: 
“Because the incident at issue in this case does not 
implicate modern concerns and because the factual 
record leaves many open questions, this is an unsuit-
able vehicle for making broad pronouncements that 
refashion basic jurisdictional rules.” 59 This strongly 
suggests that Justices Breyer and Alito are open to 
hearing another personal jurisdiction case—most 
likely one involving Internet-related contacts—in 
the near future. 
 CONCLUSION 
 Personal jurisdiction questions, particularly those 
concerning Internet-related contacts, arise often in 
civil lawsuits. Despite the frequency with which 
these issues arise, however, the personal jurisdiction 
doctrine has been plagued by complexity and confu-
sion for many years. The Supreme Court’s decision 
last term to review  Goodyear and  McIntyre provided 
hope for a resolution to some of these outstanding 
problems surrounding the personal jurisdiction analy-
sis. Unfortunately, though, the opinions issued by 
the Court—especially in  McIntyre —fall far short of 
the clear-cut guidance that lower courts and litigants 
seek. 
 If there is a silver lining in these decisions it is 
that  Goodyear clearly distinguishes between general 
and specific jurisdiction and affords some guidance 
as to the scope of general jurisdiction with its new 
“at home” standard. As for  McIntyre , the highly 
splintered opinion is so muddled and fact specific, 
that its application to other cases should be limited. 
Finally, and most importantly, several members of the 
9
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Supreme Court appear to recognize that in today’s 
fast-paced and increasingly borderless global econ-
omy, traditional constructs of personal jurisdiction 
may no longer be viable. Thus, it is unlikely that the 
Supreme Court will wait another quarter of a century 
to revisit these pressing jurisdiction issues. 
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